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In The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
FARMERS GRAIN COOPERATIVE,
Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs.-

CASE
No. 8701

EARL FREDRICKSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief, we think it only fair to add to that statement the following:
The respondent was required, under the terms of the
mortgage to purchase from the appellant "all feed required
by the mortgagor for the feeding of said turkeys." Pl.
Exhibit No. 2, Par. Third and Sub-Par. 4, Fourth. The
suit originated on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise sold. Subsequently an amended complaint
was filed, based upon the contract of the parties, represented by a note and mortgage which was entirely devoid
of any obligation on the part of the defendant to provide
insurance on the turkeys. The only place in the negotiations where any reference to insurance is made, is in defendant's Exhibit No. 5, and the reference there is to fire
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and storm insurance only. Plaintiff itself brought into the
record the question of insurance, through its Exhibit No.3
(ledger sheet) wherein appears a debit against the defendant "INSURANCE $250.00" with no explanation
whatsoever as to what kind of insurance was included in
that debit. Plaintiff through its counsel interrogated
its first witness in chief, concerning insurance, leaving
the question wholly in doubt as to the nature and
extent of insurance charged against the defendant.
Throughout the transaction between the parties, the record is replete with evidence of inaccuracies or overcharges made by plaintiff against the defendant. Every
inaccuracy or overcharge was in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, and was never corrected until by
accident, based upon meager accounts furnished defendant, he discovered, even with his lack of knowledge of
bookkeeping, that he was being overcharged and that
errors were constantly creeping into the account. Defendant was never furnished at any time with any complete account so that he could determine whether all of
of the inaccuracies or overcharges were ever corrected.
It should further be noted, that the defendant subsequently remitted the difference between $3,500.00 allowed him by the jury for excessive death of birds, and
$1,698.00, which the evidence shows their value to be,
rather than consented to it, and throughout the trial of
the case, plaintiff itself including its final witness, brought
into the record the question of insurance, and by its final
witness, even brought out the question of liability insurance and a discussion they had had out of Court with the
defendant, concerning the possibility of him filing a claim
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with the Casualty Company; notwithstanding all that, the
Court instructed the jury that so far as it was concerned,
there was no question of insurance in the case, and even if
there was, it should have no bearing on their decision.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO JUSTIFY THE INFERENCE THAT THE FEED
WAS DEFICIENT AND PROXIMATELY CAUSED
DEFENDANT'S DAMAGES. THE COURT DID
NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF CERTAIN
TESTIMONY.
POINT NO. II. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO GET
THE QUESTION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
BEFORE THE JURY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The evidence was sufficient to justify the inference
that the feed was deficient and proximately caused defendant's damages. The Court did not err in admission
of certain testimony.
The record will reveal that every poult from both
hatches from which defendant's birds were taken was
accounted for. Not only the poult supplier, but each purchaser of poults from both hatches as well, testified as to
condition of his poults at the time of delivery and mode
of transportation to point of delivery as a precaution
against the plaintiff testifying that all poults or at least
some of them were weak at delivery or that mode of trans-
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:'0rtation of defendant's poults, or weather conditions,
or some other extraneous condition might have injured or
weakened the defendant's poults.
The testimony concerning the brooding and ranging
was all to the effect that conditions under which defendant
brooded and ranged his poults were at least equal, if not
superior, to conditions of the growers of the remainder
of the batches from which defendant's poults came. The
witness H. J. Bonie was an expert in selling and servicing,
including brooding and ranging and had handled between
seven or eight million birds over a period of 20 years. His
testimony with respect to the conditions under which all of
the poults from the two batches from which defendant's
turkeys came will be found on Pages ( 48, Howard Green;
49, LeGrande Anderson; 50, Keith Jacobs and Edmond
Bell; and defendant Fredrickson Page 51) T.
The witness said, that all of the turkeys, including
defendant's were in good condition when delivered (T.
51 ) ; that brooding conditions for the defendant's poults
were ideal ( T. 54 L. 7), and that the brooding conditions
used by all the purchasers were conducive to bring about
the same results as the brooder conditions of defendant
(T. 56 L. 11-22 ), and that defendant's poults were the
only ones fed on feeds furnished by the plaintiff (T. P.
44-56), and that only turkeys from the hatches in question
from which normal, or better than normal, results were
not obtained were the poults fed on plaintiffs feeds

(T. 57).
It will be noted that the witness Bonie, has been
engaged in the hatching, selling, servicing and purchasing
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of turkeys over a period of 20 years constantly, and had
delivered seven or eight million of such birds, and had
watched them and the manner in which they were brooded
and ranged constantly, and certainly was an expert in his
field.
The testimony of Mr. Bonie, whose reputation as an
expert was not questioned, was to the effect that while
there are some dissimilarities in methods used by the
several purchasers of these broods, yet each method used
was a recognized method to bring about favorable results
in the brooding and growing of turkeys, and there is no
evidence to the contrary (T. 54-55-56). The plaintiff
having required that defendant purchase all his feed from
plaintiff, warranted the results to be obtained through
the use of its feeds, not only that but the kind and amount
of feeds to be consumed to bring about favorable results
(Defendant's Exhibit No.7). This evidence is uncontradicted and there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record,
that the conditions under which defendant's poults were
brooded, colonized and ranged were not ideal. Plaintiff
offered none, and did not even question the conclusion
of defendant's witness that they were ideal. The appellant
by its own evidence showed that its representatives
were in attendance of the defendant's flock of turkeys
frequently, and certainly had every opportunity to observe
all of th~ conditions surrounding the brooding and ranging
of the flock and no objections to any of the conditions were
ever noted. We think a fair conclusion to be reached
from all of the evidence, is that after defendant's birds
began dying excessively and they were dissected at the
Utah State University by Dr. Miner, that plaintiff through
its representative, Leonard, refused to follow the advise
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and recommendations of Dr. Miner, but assumed on his
own the feeding of terramyacin to the poults for at least
a week after Dr. Miner recommended placing the poults
on a milk diet to compensate for a Vitamin "B" deficiency
(De£' s. Ex. No. 8), and under defendant's contract with
plaintiff, he had no choice but to follow the directions of
the plaintiff. (Pl. Ex. No. 2).
The testimony of Grant F. White, who has for several
years grown turkeys in the vicinity of defendant's range,
and who from his testimony, is an extremely well experienced turkey grower (T. 188-190) testified that the
brooding facilities of defendant's poults were as good,
or better than the witness' facilities (T. 190). That the
year in question, his turkeys were ranged within a mile
and a half of defendant's range; that the conditions of
defendant's range was better for that purpose than the
witness' range ( T. 191); further, that the witness' mortality rate for brooding for 1953 was less than 4%. That his
hen turkeys at the end of 23 weeks ran 12 lbs. and 13 lbs.
at the end of 24 weeks, and the toms between 22 lbs and
23 lbs. for the same time, (T. 192); that malnutrition
during brooding,
"Naturally slows the growth of that turkey down.
It would take a longer period for a turkey that has
been stunted to grow to a prime bird than it would
a healthy bird." (T. 193).
A fair resume of the testimony concerning the nutrition deficiency in the feeds is as follows: Wilson, one of
plaintiff's dealers, testified that the pellets were too large
and un-uniform in size; that the plaintiff's method of mak-
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ing pellets and crumbles was likely to result in a loss of
vitamins through repeated heating without use of a gelatin covered vitamin, which they did not use. (T. 203 ).
Wilson testified that other complaints came to the company concerning their feeds (T. 204) and that he was
called into their Ogden Plant to assist in overcoming the
trouble they were experiencing (T. 205) (fines and
lumps). Hodges testified that crumbles were un-uniform
in size, and were too large and that the poults would not
and could not eat them; hence, they became stale, the
young poults became uneasy, commenced chirping and
picking the vents of each other, commonly called cannibalism, commencing about a week after he received the
poults and just prior to the time when excessive deaths
resulted (T. 173-175).
Dr. Miner, the veterinarian from the Utah State University, testified that vitamin deficiency usually results
in the picking of vents (T. 219-230) and answering to the
hypothetical question testified that nutritive deficiency in
the feeds usually shows up in the health of the poults after
about 10 days to 2 weeks (T. 230), and the evidence
shows that the excessive death rate commenced about 10
days after the first delivery of poults, and after being put
on plaintiff's feeds. It is pertinent to note, that the contract between the parties (Pl. Ex. No. 2), required defendant,
"To keep the poults properly fed, housed and cared
for 0 according to required and approved methods
and purchase all the feed from plaintiff or follow
their directions." (Pl. Ex. No. 2, Sub. 5 of Par.
Fourth.)
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All of the testimony in the record is to the effect that
they were housed and cared for according to required
and approved methods. There is no evidence to the contrary. That datnages and the inference as to the proximate
cause of damages may be shown by comparison with the
other flocks was determined by this Court in the leading
Utah case, Park vs. Moorman Mfg. Co., ( 241 P 2d, 914,
Syllibus No. 10 on P. 920), wherein this Court said:
"Appellant further contends that the evidence in this
case is insufficient to justify the inference that plaintiff's loss was the proximate result of the use of either
the feed or the method of feeding or both. The
record contains testimony of defendant's own veterinarian that the feed or plan could have caused plaintiff's loss. There was further testimony of other
witnesses who had used the feed and had had undesirable results. The inference drawn by officers of
plaintiff company and by buyers from plaintiff that
the chickens on plaintiff's feed and plan were far
below the chickens on the other plan, and that
such condition came· within a significant period after
defendant's feed and plan were adopted is further
evidence of proximate cause. This question of proximate cause is likewise a jury question. Taking the
evidence most favorable to the defendant, there is
substantial evidence established by the record to support the jury's implied finding as to proximate cause
of the loss."
This Court has also substantiated inference through
the elimination of other possible causes in Andreason vs.
Industrial Commission, (98 Utah 551; 100 P. 2d, 202).
There is no evidence in the instant case upon which any
inference could be made other than that the excessive
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losses suffered by the defendant, came from a nutritional
deficiency and the wrongful use of anti-biotics. Every
other possible cause was eliminated insofar as the poults
themselves and the housing and methods of caring for
them was concerned, and plaintiff offered no evidence to
the contrary.
The amount of the Judgment is not in question in
this case. The only question with respect to damages
raised, is that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant
any damages.

An analysis of the hypothetical question put to Dr.
Miner, beginning Line 19, P. 229 Tr., fairly sums up the
evidence ellicited from the witness Bonie, and the other
purchasers of these poults and the witness White, as to
all the conditions of the poults when received, and the
conditions under which they were brooded and ranged,
and the results obtained. If by that method all other
causes or inferences other than nutritional deficiences
were eliminated, based upon the facts in the case, then
certainly the hypothetical question and the foundation
laid is sufficient and proper. We are not advised of any
conditions set forth in the question which is not substantiated by the evidence already in the record. Certainly
plaintiff in its brief does not call attention to any assumed
facts not in the evidence upon which its objection to the
question was made.
It should further be noted that the only objection
made to the question was whether or not the witness had
an opinion as to cause. The objection was overruled the witness answered yes. Next question:
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"What is your opinion, Dr.?" and there was no objection to that. (T. 230).
Plaintiff sets out on Page 8 of its brief that on crossexamination the witness, Dr. Miner, stated in his report
that nutritive conditions are the result of perhaps one of
four reasons which are:
1. Insufficient intake of food;
2. Lack of proper nutrients in the feed;
3. Interference of absorption of nutrients in the intestinal tract by chemicals or bacterial growth; and
4. That the nutrients were in a form not readily
utilized.
An analysis of the evidence shows that ( 1) because
the pellets and crumbles were too large and un-uniform in
size that the poults could not and did not eat them, and
they were left to become stale in the feeders; hence, insufficient intake of food. Dr. Miner's report, defendants
Ex. No. 8, shows ( 2) a lack of proper nutrients in the feed,
and a milk diet was recommended. Dr. Miner's report
shows ( 3 ) there was no bacterial growth in the intestines
in the poults dissected by him which would cause any
trouble, and ( 4) the crumbles and pellets, being too large
and not uniform in size is conclusive evidence that they
were in such form that they could not be readily utilizedso <:>very point raised by the doctor is apparently favorable
to the defendant, and a sufficient answer to the hypothetical question propounded to him.
We are unable to see where plaintiff receives any
comfort from its Citation of Authorities, from 66 A.L.R.
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86 since it seems to us from a reading of the annotation~
that the same is not in point and refers vaguely, if at all,
to a situation such as the case here, and many of the cases
cited therein are actually against Plaintiff's conclusion and
in favor of the conclusion reached by the learned trial
Court here, in admitting the evidence complained of.
(Winter-Loeb Grocery Company vs. Boiken, 203 Atlanta
187-82 Southern 437) (Said cases from 82 to 86, and 92
to 96 inclusive) ( 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 308, P. 286).
ARGUMENT
POINT II
The plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendant's attempt to get the point of insurance coverage before the
jury.
The question of insurance was introduced to the jury
by the plaintiff itself. An examination of the record reveals that the question of insurance was not inadvertently
brought in as a part of the plaintiff's case, but was coBsciously and intentionally brought in and the manner in
which it was brought in and pursued by plaintiff counsel
could hardly have any effect, except to infer and lead
the jury to believe that any loss in the raising of these
turkeys sustained by the defendant Fredrickson was covered by insurance to him.
Exhibit No. 3, offered by plaintiff through its witness Young, includes the following item:
"V1825 INSURANCE $250.00."
Counsel for plaintiff on direct examination asked the
following questions and ellicited the following answers:
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"Q. Will you please explain this ledger sheet in connection with these papers in Exhibit Four? Do you have,
in those papers that are part of Exhibit Four, an invoice
that corresponds with each entry on your ledger sheet?
A. I think with one exception.

Q. What would that exception be?
it.

A. That was the INSURANCE PREMIUM paid on
(Caps ours).

Q. And there is a copy of the original document in
the record for that, is there not?
A. There's a copy of the invoice.
voucher."

Not of the

Mr. Huggins stated that he did not get the exception
noted about the insurance premium, and Mr. Olson stated
that he said that an original of the invoice for each of
the entries is here except the one for the INSURANCE
PREMIUM (Caps ours), of which there was a copy of
the invoice, but not of the voucher (T. 10-11). So that,
plaintiff having introduced a charge against the defenant which was not included in the contract between the
parties (PI's. Ex. No.2), defendant was entitled to know
as a part of the account charged against him, what the
particular items therein noted were for, since there was
no reference in the contract or mortgage that insurance
was chargeable against the defendant. Defendant's counsel had no alternative but to determine whether it was a
proper charge against his client, the defendant; particularly in view of the otl1er overcharges made, and certainly
the defendant was not examined or interrogated to any
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greater extent about that item than any other item in the
account. On cross examination the plaintiff's witness
Young was asked:

"Q. Do you know what that charge amounted to?
A.

$3,675.00.

Q. Now, was that the only amount in your Exhibit
No. 1 in addition to the cost of feed?
A. I believe that's correct, sir. The INSURANCE,
AS I REMEMBER, IS ALSO INCLUDED THERE.
(Volunteered) (Caps ours).
Q. Do you know how much the insurance was?
A.

$250.00.

Q. And what does that represent, Mr. Young?
A. That was insurance against loss by various contingencies stipulated in the policy. Fire principally.

Q. On the Fredrickson turkeys?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, that was insurance you had purchased to cover any losses you might sustain?
A. HE might sustain. (Meaning the defendant)
(Caps ours).
Q. That came from fire or theft OR ANY OTIIER
CASUALTY? (Caps ours).
A. Well, that would be mentioned on the insurance
policy, I cannot tell you exactly." T. P. 12-13).
It will be noted that the insurance policy was not
offered in evidence to show what coverage it included,
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and hence, the only way defendant could determine that
fact, and whether it was a proper charge against him,
was by interrogating the witness who did know, on cross
examination, just exactly what kind of insurance plaintiff
had injected into the case, under circumstances highly prejudicial to the said defendant. Since insurance on the
defendant's turkeys had been placed before the jury by
plaintiff, defendant had no alternative but to refute the
implication in plaintiff's testimony, that if plaintiff recovered its judgment against the defendant, the defendant
was insured to cover his loss. It is rather an anomaly that
the plaintiff finds itself in this Court to defend itself
against a prejudicial error created by plaintiff itself. It
is axiomatic: "A party who participates in or contributes
to an error, cannot complain of it." McDonald vs. McNidt
(Mont.) 206 P. 1096; 5 C.J.S.; P. 173 Section 1501; McKinney vs. Red Top Cab Co. (Cal.) 299 P. 113. See also
Nobel vs. Miles, et ux, 19 P. 2d. P. 296, wherein the Supreme Court of California clearly and succinctly states
the rule as follows:
"(7-10) The rule is firmly established by numerous
decisions that parties must abide by the consequences
of their own acts and cannot seek a reversal of the
case for error which they invited. In other words,
one who by his own conduct invites error is
estopped afterwards from complaining of the prejudicial effect flowing therefrom. (2 Cal. Jur. 846,
848 ;Seale vs. Garr, 155 Cal. 577, 102 P. 262)."
All references to insurance by the defendant were
directed at determining whether the item shown in plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 was a proper charge against the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant, and no one mentioned INSURANCE ON FEED
except the plaintiffs witness Young, WHO VOLUNTEERED the information: (Caps ours).
"I think we are insured for any damages which may
arise for defective feed. I have never seen that policy
but I am sure we have such a policy." (T. 24).
It will be noted that at no time did the defendant
ask the question of any witness whether there was any
insurance covering casualty from defective feed. Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 which is not a part of the contract,
is a request on the part of the plaintiff that the turkeys
"be protected by fire and storm insurance." Any inquiry by defendant's counsel concerning the insurance
premium charged against the defendant was propounded
to determine whether that premium included other insurance than that which the letter indicates.

Plaintiff again brought in the question of insurance
by its own question, ( T. P. 24 L. 28) :

"Q. Well, for instance, on the insurance Mr. Huggins
was asking you about. You actually paid a $250.00
premium for him to some company?
A. That was for insurance on his particular lot of
turkeys."
Mr. Olson again referred to the question of insurance,
(T. 27 L. 1):

"Q. And then the insurance would be another item
that you'd paid cash out for?
A. Yes, sir."
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Throughout the case only one objection to the question of insurance was made by plaintiffs counsel (T. 24).
However plaintiff reintroduced the question of insurance
through its witness Leonard, as follows, by Mr. Stine:

"Q. Was any further discussion had at that time?
A. He brought up the various factors mentioned, if
there couldn't have been an error in our books or an error
somewhere along the line in the amount of feed consumed
and various phases of that. We were still trying to find
out what might have happened, and in the meantime he
had just come from Wilfred Young's office over in the main
building and advised me that Wilfred Young had told
him that we were insured in regards to trouble that might
occur from the use of our feed. Therefore, he was wondering if it wouldn't be wise to enter a claim against the insurance company and settle the thing up.

Q. Any further conversation take place?
A. I told him that if his claim substantiated the
facts in the case, I agreed with him heartily, that at the
time I doubted very much that he had a claim that would
hold up. I advised against such practice.

Q. And what did you say to him as regards the
merits of the claim?
A. I told him I doubted very much that he'd be able
to prove that the feed was insufficient, a deficiency.
Strictly my own opinion. I told him it was strictly my
own opinion, but I would hesitate to go ahead and spend
a lot of money until I was pretty sure." (Tr. 358-359).
So, not only did the plaintiff introduce the question
of insurance initially, but pursued the question perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sistently to the conclusion of the case, when it would be
most likely to be remembered by the jury, and it is conceivable that there might have been a definite purpose
in getting the question of insurance, casualty and liability
insurance before the jury at this stage of the trial. A close
analysis of all of the evidence concerning insurance
shows that defendant did not bring the question of
insurance to the attention of the jury, but that plaintiff itself introduced the subject and persisted in following through.
In any event, the learned trial Court overcame plaintiff's introduction of the question of insurance, by instructing the jury that so far as the Court was aware there was
no insurance involved in this case, but even if there was,
it should have nothing to do with their decision in the
case (Instructions No. 14).
There is nothing in this record to show that any reference to insurance had any effect upon the verdict.
American Jurisprudence, Page 591 of Section 1034
shows:
"Only a few courts go to the extreme of holding that
the mere mention of insurance in the course of the
trial is so prejudicial as to require reversal. In general
however, the burden is on the party INDUCING
THE ADMISSION OF SUCH EVIDENCE to remove a possible prejudice 0 " (Plaintiff introduced
the question. ) (Caps ours).
The general view, however, is that error in introducing in evidence the fact that the defendant in a
negligence case is insured may be cured by proper
"o
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instructions directing the jury to disregard the matter,
particularly if it can be said that the verdict was not
affected thereby."
Likewise, even though the testimony is improper
when it originally comes into the case, there is no
reversible error if the fact of insurance is subsequently
made properly to appear in the trial. See also 5 C.J.S.
173: Sec. 1501."

"o

All of the evidence, except that which was volunteered by plaintiffs own witness Leonard, is to the effect
that the only insurance amounted to fire insurance on the
turkeys themselves.
We agree with plaintiffs counsel that none of the
cases on the question of insurance cited by them in its
Brief, pages 12 and 13, are exactly in point to the instant
case - in fact, we go further than that - that in our opinion, they have no bearing on this case whatsover as a
careful reading of the cases will indicate.
In Balle vs. Smith, 81 Utah 179; 17 P. 2d, 224, where
counsel for plaintiff interrogated a prospective juror concerning the question of liability insurance, this Court
cautioned against the unguarded efforts to get such question before the jury, as folows:
"In negligence cases where defendant has liability
insurance it is required that questions to prospective
jurors be carefully safeguarded. Protection of parties'
rights is within the Judge's wise discretion. (Syllibus
4) ."
In the case of Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Ut. 2d 392;
284 P. 2d, 1115 the question involved was whether an
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admission by the defendant that he had liability coverage
was competent to prove an admission of liability.
In Ried vs. Owens, 98 Utah 50; 93 Pac. 2d, 680, the
question involved was whether it was error to admit
testimony of defendant concerning knowledge of his son's
careless driving and the providing of insurance to guard
against the consequences of it, as an admission of liability
or responsibility. We find nothing in this case which has
any bearing upon the instant case.
Mter citing rules of evidence in other Courts, this
Court said:
"These rules are all wise precautionary measures to
prevent the introduction in evidence of immaterial
and irrevelant but highly prejudicial adversions to
liability insurance."
The case of Morrison vs. Peery, cited by appellant,
104 Utah 139; 122 Pac. 2d, 191, makes no allusion to insurance whatsoever, in the main opinion. There is a dissent by Justice Wolfe which did not become the opinion
of the Court in which there is some discussion of insurance
but it has no bearing on this case whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted therefore, that a careful
analysis and appraisal of all the testimony in this case
could lead to no other conclusion but that the excessive
mortality of the defendant's poults and their failure to mature properly within a normal range of the time, and with
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normal amounts of feed was proximately caused by the
defective feed furnished to defendant by plaintiff as
follows:
.
1.

Vitamin "B" deficiency in the starter mash.

2. Deficiency of intake by reason of the oversize and
irregular sized crumbles, further aggravated by the use of
terramyacin against the doctors instructions, and at the
insistence of the plaintiff.
Further, plaintiff cannot recover now, a reversal of
the judgment based upon the consequences of its own
actions in introducing and pursuing the question of insurance.
Further, there is no claim made, and certainly none
could be made fairly from the evidence, that the judgment
entered by the Court, under all the circumstances, is not
fair and just.
Respectfully submitted,
HUGGINS & HUGGINS,
By IRA A. HUGGINS, and
NEWEL G. DAINES,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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